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Abstract 
Our goal is to get better understanding of different kind of dependencies behind the 
high-level capability areas. The models are suitable for investigating present state 
capabilities or future developments of capabilities in the context of technology 
forecasting. Three levels are necessary for a model describing effects of 
technologies on military capabilities. These levels are capability areas, systems 
and technologies. The contribution of this paper is to present one possible model 
for interdependencies between technologies. Modelling interdependencies between 
technologies is the last building block in constructing a quantitative model for 
technological forecasting including necessary levels of abstraction. This study 
supplements our previous research and as a result we present a model for the 
whole process of capability modelling. As in our earlier studies, capability is 
defined as the probability of a successful task or operation or proper functioning of 
a system. In order to obtain numerical data to demonstrate our model, we 
conducted a questionnaire to a group of defence technology researchers where 
interdependencies between seven representative technologies were inquired. 
Because of a small number of participants in questionnaires and general 
uncertainties concerning subjective evaluations, only rough conclusions can be 
made from the numerical results. 
Introduction 
 
New technologies can provide new and more effective military capabilities. New 
technologies can present threat or opportunity and their future development is 
uncertain.  The uncertainty that characterises technologies mean that the military 
cannot know which emerging technologies mature to have profound impacts, how 
long that maturing will take nor the technological trajectory. Most emerging 
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technologies represent incremental improvements and enhance the competencies of 
the military. This kind of technological development presents few challenges to the 
military, although their adoption into existing platforms can be difficult. In 
contrast, it is new technologies that are radical, degrade competence and create new 
sources of military advantage along dimensions not traditionally valued or poorly 
understood by the military that are the focus of attention and concern. An emerging 
technology that undermines existing training, equipment and doctrine will have 
more impact on the military than one that complements or enhances existing 
military competencies. (James, 2013) 
 
Fundamental concepts of this paper are capabilities, systems and technologies. 
Each of these has several different descriptions. We provide some of the most 
common definitions of these three concepts. Capability has been defined as the 
ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a 
target set). The concept of capability has been used to express the level of will, 
amount of troops and armament. In many countries capability areas have been 
standardized as a set of specifications that cover the complete range of military 
activities. A system is a set of interacting or interdependent component parts 
forming a complex/intricate whole. Systems share common characteristics 
including structure, behaviour and interconnectivity. Technology is the collection 
of techniques, skills, methods and processes used in the production 
of goods or services. It is the state of knowledge of how to combine resources to 
produce desired products, to solve problems, fulfil needs, or satisfy wants. 
 
In this paper we examine interdependencies of technologies and impacts of 
technologies on military capabilities. In our earlier research we have examined 
impacts of systems on military capabilities (Kuikka & Suojanen, 2014) and impacts 
of single technologies on military capabilities (Kuikka et al., 2015). In the present 
work we complement the modelling by taking into account influences of multiple 
technologies on system capabilities and top-level capability areas. In this respect, 
our aim is two-fold: to provide the missing piece of the modelling and give the big 
picture of the modelling results of our earlier research and this paper. To this end, 
we provide also a literature review of articles that are related to concepts and 
models of our work. The review is not a comprehensive survey of research in 
technology forecasting or capability modelling. The review serves as an 
introduction to the research field and other research projects comparable to our 
work. The theoretical and methodological literature ground our present work and 
guide for further investigation. 
 
In this study, a functional dependency of military capabilities on technical 
development is presented. Questionnaire data is used as an input for modelling 
relationships between operational tasks, systems, technologies and capability areas. 
In this context, capability is defined as the probability of successful task or 
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operation, or functioning of a system. The functional form gives an approximation 
for calculating effects of different technological developments on capabilities. 
 
In literature, describing military capabilities has been examined for a long time. 
Not many quantitative models have been published. Another problem is the lack of 
a measure for capabilities. In an earlier study, we have introduced also an 
alternative measure for strategy (Hämäläinen & Nikkarila, 2015). We propose a 
model based on a probabilistic measure of capabilities. The same measure is used 
in all levels of the model: capability areas, systems, tasks and technology areas. 
 
The main idea is to show how to evaluate interdependencies between technology 
areas. For example, material technology has a significant effect on sensor 
technology. Progress in the first area implies progress in the latter area. Notice that 
interdependencies are not necessarily symmetric; for example sensor technology 
depends significantly on material technology, while the dependency in the opposite 
direction is weaker. Seven technology areas are considered: sensor, material, 
communications, stealth, energy source, manufacturing, and autonomous operation 
technologies. Five different operational tasks are used in the evaluation. 
 
In the literature, different mathematical methods have been used when multiple 
interdependent variables are affecting the forecast. Examples are principal 
component analysis (Windrum et al., 2009), simulation methods and time series 
methods (De Gooijer & Hyndman, 2006). Typically these methods need more data 
than is available in our study. Some forecasting methods try to identify the 
underlying factors that might influence the variable that is being forecasted. 
 
Judgmental forecasting methods incorporate intuitive judgments, opinions and 
subjective probability estimates. This characterization is also valid in our study. In 
addition, we construct models on the bases of questionnaire results. In this paper, 
we model interdependency of technology areas and dependency between 
technology areas and task capabilities. This study is one piece in larger modelling 
effort trying to increase our understanding of military capabilities. (Kuikka & 
Suojanen, 2014, Suojanen et al., 2015 and Kuikka et al., 2015 and references 
therein) 
 
The operational analysis methodologies used in this work include systems 
modelling, probabilistic mathematical methods, statistical evaluations, information 
modelling and the use of questionnaires as the input data. 
Related Work 
 
In this section, a review of papers related to concepts, methods or application areas 
used in this paper is presented. First, we review articles on general theory of 
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technological change, which focus on questions like why certain technological 
developments emerge instead of others, are there regularities in the process of 
generation of new technologies and in technological progress thereafter, and is 
there a regularity in the functional relationship between the vast number of 
economic, social, institutional, scientific factors which are likely to influence the 
innovation process (Dosi, 1982). After general theory of technological change, we 
bring up a few articles on technometrics. Technometrics is a discipline that 
measures and evaluates technological change with important policy implications. 
The main techniques of technometrics and their potential and methodological 
difficulties have been presented in (Coccia, 2005). Scenario planning is a method 
for design and evaluation of capabilities, describing rare events and technology 
forecasting. Three articles related with scenario planning are referenced. Articles 
assessing weapon system capabilities, comparison between jet fighter aircraft and 
decision-analytic approach to reliability-based design optimization are related to 
methods in this paper. Finally, we give references closely related to our research of 
interdependency of technologies in the context of technological innovations and 
capability planning. In the following, we review related research articles and 
indicate their connections with our research. Similarities as well as different 
approaches with our method are commented after the references in each section. 
 
The long-run economic innovation has been analysed as the interplay between 
supply-side and demand-side processes. These are technology-push and demand-
pull forces. On the supply-side three different interacting development processes 
have been identified: growing productive efficiency, the emergence of new sectors 
and the increasing quality and differentiation of existing products. The time path of 
economic development cannot be explained by taking into account a supply-side 
view alone. Without an adequate demand, development processes cannot be 
generated. The situation can be described as the co-evolution of demand, 
innovation and supply (Saviotti & Pyka, 2013). Demand influences the selection 
among competing paradigms and the course of the paradigm after its inception. For 
example, in the history of computing technology a distinction can be made between 
periods in which either demand or knowledge development was the dominant 
enabler of innovation (van den Ende & Dolsma, 2002). Niches in evolutionary 
theories have been investigated in explaining radical technical change (Schot & & 
Geels, 2007). Radical change or technological discontinuity is defined as the 
establishment of a new sociotechnical regime. Sociotechnical regimes carry and 
store rules for how to produce, use and regulate specific technologies. The 
difference between niches results from differentiating between whether niches are 
internal or external to the prevailing sociotechnical regime and whether rules for 
design are stable or unstable within the niche. Our model describes the course of 
technological development after its inception with a linear model together with 
secondary multiplicative linear effects on other technologies. The dependencies 
between technology areas are linear but the overall effects on capability values are 
non-linear due to the interdependencies between technology areas. 
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The model of technological paradigms and trajectories (Dosi, 1982) account for 
both continuous change and discontinuous change in technological innovations. 
Continuous changes are related to progress along a technical trajectory defined by a 
technical paradigm, while discontinuities are associated with the emergence of a 
new paradigm. Technological paradigm has been defined in accordance with a set 
of procedures, a definition of relevant problems and the specific knowledge related 
to their solution. Technology trajectory is defined as the direction of advance 
within a technology trajectory. A radical innovation is founded on the creation of a 
new set of technology solutions, and results in a new trajectory that is qualitative 
different (Dosi, 1982). A model of technological evolution based on replicator 
dynamics has been presented (Saviotti & Mani, 1995) where the relationship 
between variety and competition has been studied. Probabilistic entropy statistics 
and scaling trajectories in 143 civil aircraft designs have been analysed in terms of 
changes in the product characteristics (Frenken & Leydesdorff, 2000). Distinction 
has been made between technical and service characteristics. Technical 
characteristics were defined as variables that can directly be manipulated by 
producers. Variables that users take into account in their purchasing decisions were 
considered as service characteristics. In our model, service characteristics can be 
identified with system services or functionalities and technical characteristics can 
be identified with technical features or attributes. Our basic model is designed for 
linear technological changes in technology areas including secondary effects on 
other technology areas. However, the model can be modified to include jumps 
triggered at specified levels. This can be easily implemented in a spreadsheet 
application. The secondary effects follow automatically. Even a more general 
functional form could be used, for example, exponential development. Our model 
takes into account the first order secondary effects in other technology areas, but 
the model does not account for ‘economics of scale’ which might support an 
exponential functional form.  
 
The complex relationship between technical and service characteristics has been 
explored in (Windrum et al., 2009). Principal component analysis (PCA) has been 
used as a method of the analysis of a dataset of mobile phone handsets. 
Technological trajectories by means of a detailed case-study of the evolution of 
tank technology between 1915 and 1945 has been analysed with principal 
component analysis in (Castaldi et al., 2009). A hierarchic conceptualisation of 
tank technology with technical and service characteristics has been used in the 
modelling. Our model of system of systems consists of serial and parallel systems 
and subsystems. Even a simple system structure may describe high level 
capabilities and their long term development as well as more detailed hierarchic 
models or purely statistical methods such as PCA. 
 
The scale of innovative intensity (SIIN) based on the economic impact of the 
technological innovation on the economic system has been used as a theoretical 
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measure for technological change (Coccia, 2003). The SIIN is similar to the 
seismic scale of measuring the intensity of earthquakes. Three families of 
complexity models of technology innovation have been discussed in (Frenken, 
2006): fitness landscape models, network models and percolation models. The 
models are capable of analysing complex interaction structures while avoiding 
over-parameterisation. Technological developments in the network connecting 
patents have been analysed in (Schoen et al., 2012). In our model, a probabilistic 
measure for high level capabilities and system capabilities is proposed. This is a 
quantitative and intuitive measure suitable for all levels of capability modelling. 
The probability of success in an operation is considered to be a natural selection in 
the military context. Especially, when modelling complex interactions and 
structures, it is important to have an understandable and quantitative method. High 
uncertainties in long term forecasting support a simple model instead of more 
sophisticated considerations. 
 
In technology planning, forecasting, strategic analysis, foresight studies, scenarios 
are used to incorporate and emphasize those aspects of the world that are important 
to the forecast. A review of scenario planning been presented in (Amur et al., 
2013). Scenario-based design and evaluation for military capabilities has been 
analysed in (Urwinet et al., 2010). Scenarios are helpful in visualizing and 
understanding the incorporation of new systems within system of systems. The 
approach is based on the development of measure of effectiveness and performance 
and the techniques have been illustrated using cases that are relevant to network 
enabled capability. The measures of performance are independent of an operational 
scenario and allow the results to be compared with systems that provide the same 
functionality. In contrast, measures of effectiveness are dependent on an 
operational scenario. The scenario is composed of vignettes that contextualize the 
principal phases of systems development to meet a capability need. One or more 
operational vignettes must be included to test the deployed system (Urwinet et al., 
2010). In our approach, three different representative scenarios have been used in 
the first questionnaire. The functionalities realised by system services and used in 
the operational tasks are similar in different scenarios. As a result, our second and 
third questionnaires which are not dealing with capability areas or system 
capabilities did not use scenarios explicitly. This is in accordance with (Urwinet et. 
al., 2010). 
 
The practice of scenario planning implicitly accepts that managers are not able to 
make valid assessments of the likelihood of unique future events and that best 
guesses of what the future may hold may be wrong (Goodwin & Wright, 2010). 
Scenarios focus on key uncertainties and certainties about the future and construct 
vivid descriptions of the world. In their paper Goodwin and Wright review methods 
that aim to aid the anticipation of rare, high-impact, events. Methods are evaluated 
according to their ability to yield well-calibrated probabilities or point forecasts for 
such events. Authors conclude that all the methods are problematic for aiding the 
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anticipation of rare events and provide some remedies. Human judgement is often 
used to estimate the probabilities of events occurring. Goodwin and Wright point 
out possible cognitive biases. Events which are vivid, recent, unusual or 
highlighted by the media are assigned high probabilities. A tendency to ignore 
base-rate information and frequencies or anchoring on the current value and 
insufficient adjustment for the effect of future conditions are sources of biases in 
questionnaires based of human judgment. Our work is also based on questionnaires 
and human judgment, which should be paid attention when the results are assessed. 
However, our main objective has been to demonstrate the model building and for 
this purpose the questionnaire data is sufficient. Rare events occur in very special 
scenarios which make scenarios an essential tool for investigating rare events. Our 
method can be used directly for rare events and the results for capability areas and 
system capabilities can be used in planning and preparing for these rare events. 
Another way of using scenarios with different probabilities is to calculate an 
expected value for capability areas or system capabilities. The expected value is 
obtained with the probabilities of scenarios as weights in the sum of scenario 
capabilities. 
 
A quantitative comparison between U.S. and U.S.S.R/Russian jet fighters (Bongers 
& Torres, 2013) estimates the relationship between the first flight date and a set of 
performance and technical characteristics such as thrust, climb rate, basic avionics, 
advanced avionics and stealth. Linear regression has been used as a mathematical 
tool. Another article includes a case study of main battle tank capability (Jiang et 
al., 2011). Weapon system capability assessment is a multiple criteria decision 
making problem with both quantitative and qualitative information under uncertain 
environment. Authors use belief structures model and evidential reasoning 
approach which were developed to deal with various types of uncertainties such as 
ignorance and subjectivity. The assessment framework for capabilities is 
hierarchic. A decision-analytic approach to reliability-based design optimization 
has been presented in a theoretical article (Bordley & Pollock, 2009). In their work, 
similar concepts to this paper are used but the approach is more theoretical. Several 
articles consider uncertain environments and use different methods for this 
purpose. Using probabilities might be suitable in many of these cases. Linear 
regression is not a optimal method for forecasting extreme events, such as the first 
flight day. As we have discussed in (Kuikka et al., 2015), few dedicated methods 
exist in this area. Because our model deals with interdependencies between 
technology areas, the method in this paper may be suitable also for these cases. Our 
method is a candidate for interpreting the first flight days, or comparable events. 
This can be considered in following studies. 
 
A standardization of terminology of technology by conceptualizing products as 
complex artefacts that evolve in the form of a nested hierarchy of technology 
cycles. Such a system perspective provides both unambiguous definitions of 
dominant designs (stable core components that can be stable interfaces) and 
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inclusion of multiple levels of analysis (system, subsystems, components) 
(Murmann & Frenken, 2006). A new conceptual model for understanding 
technological evolution that highlights dynamic and highly interdependent 
relationships among multiple technologies has been proposed in (Adomavicius et 
al., 2005). The authors conclude that when technology evolution is discussed, a 
single technology cannot be considered in isolation. The technology ecosystem 
consists of a dynamic system that includes the totality of interrelated technologies. 
The authors identify three roles that technologies play within a technology 
ecosystem: components, products and applications and infrastructure. Types of 
interactions between technology roles have been classified as different kind of 
paths of influence. The use of the model has been demonstrated through the Wi-Fi 
business case. In this paper, because of the diversity of interdependencies between 
technologies, a simple matrix formulation is proposed for the modelling of 
technology areas. Modelling technologies with the principles of system of systems’ 
methods, for example, is challenging because a technology area interacts with all 
the other technology areas. 
 
A method for hierarchically prioritizing capabilities with an application to military 
manned and unmanned aerial vehicles provides the linkage between mission 
requirements to capability delivery options (Bourdon et al., 2014). The method 
provides a structure for breaking down requirements hierarchically into form 
against which selected capabilities can be assessed. Planning for military 
requirements is not bounded by a single threat that was expected to be faced in 
future conflicts. The planning is based on capabilities needed to win a conflict by 
defeating a range of threats encountered. The hierarchical prioritization of 
capabilities provides a broad high-level assessment of potential offered by different 
unmanned aerial vehicles. The method avoids comparing all the possible pairs of 
roles and tasks of UAVs as is necessary in the analytical hierarchy process (AHP). 
Another benefit of the model is that the addition of new missions, tasks, or roles 
does not invalidate previous assessments. This is not the case with other methods 
such as AHP in which the relative weights of two alternatives may change based on 
the introduction of a third alternative. Weapon selection using AHP and TOPSIS 
(technique for order performance by similarity to idea solution) methods under 
fuzzy environment has been analysed in (Dagdeviren et al., 2009). The AHP is 
used to analyse the structure of the weapon system in a fuzzy environment and to 
determine the wrights of the criteria, and fuzzy TOPSIS method is used to obtain 
final ranking. Again, the research problems in (Bourdon et al., 2014) and 
(Dagdeviren et al., 2009) bear resemblance with our research problems.  Our 
method has also a favourable feature that adding a system to a system of systems 
does not result in recalculating all the pairs of systems. 
 
Interoperability in military systems-of-systems architectures and capability-based 
quantitative technology evaluation have been addressed in (Wyatt et al., 2012) and 
(Biltgen & Mavris, 2007). The increasing complexity of net-centric warfare 
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requires systems to be interoperable to achieve mission success. The research 
surveys existing interoperability measurement methods and assess them from 
perspective of using interoperability as a metric to evaluate system-of-systems 
architectures. The purpose of the methodology has been to enable quantitative 
evaluation of technologies in a systems-of-systems context and enumerate how 
resources should be allocated to new technology development programs. The 
methodology provides insight into sensitivities of technologies on top-level 
capability metrics. In many cases, these sensitivities have been obscured by 
complexity of the problem. A holistic approach to the modelling and simulation of 
complex systems facilitates a traceable analysis process. The work demonstrates 
several ways that surrogate models can leverage to speed up processes, 
simultaneously examine technologies and tactics, and to enable next-generation 
visualization capabilities for systems-of-systems. The authors plan to extend their 
approach to examine multiple capabilities across a range of scenarios and will 
incorporate variable fidelity models to examine different trends and behaviours at 
varying levels of detail. Methods used in (Wyatt et al., 2012) and (Biltgen & 
Mavris, 2007) are different while the research goals and use of the results are 
similar. Simultaneous examination of technologies and tactics, resource allocation 
to new technology programs, sensitivity analysis of technology areas on top-level 
capability areas, system of systems’ modelling and variable fidelity of systems and 
subsystems are common principles with our research methods. 
Modelling the Interdependencies between Technology Areas 
 
In this section we go through the steps of our model from technology areas to 
capability areas. Numerical results will be presented later in this paper, because we 
need some background from our earlier studies which will be presented in the next 
section. Our study is based on a questionnaire conducted in Finnish National 
Defence University in International What If?-data farming workshop. The 
questionnaire had two parts. In the first part the values for protection, situational 
awareness and engagement capability areas were asked for two systems and their 
combined use. The systems used were satellites and UAVs (Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles).  
 
In Figure 1 the structure of the overall model is described. In the first part (Q1 in 
Figure 1) of the questionnaire capability values for three capability areas were 
asked for satellites, UAVs and combined use of the systems. In the second part (Q2 
in Figure 1) the effects of seven technology areas on five operational task 
capabilities were asked. Relationship “T/C” in Figure 1, is established by 
identifying three tasks with three capability areas. An additional survey (Q3 in 
Figure 1) was conducted among five technical persons (5 out of 10) of the same 
group. The analysis of Q3 results is the subject of this study. In this part, 
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interdependencies between technology areas were asked. The questionnaire 
structure is summarized in Table 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hierarchic levels of the model. Three parts of the questionnaire are 
denoted Q1, Q2 and Q3. It is noticeable that there exists a sub model for each Qi 
(i=1, 2, 3) and the sub-models are modular components in the process flowchart. 
 
In this paper our focus is in technological level. We present the connection between 
the development of technology areas and task capabilities. Our model consists of 
three phases corresponding three parts of the questionnaire. In our earlier work, we 
have presented models corresponding Q1 (Kuikka & Suojanen, 2014) and Q2 
(Kuikka et al., 2015). In this paper we examine interdependencies Q3 between 
different technology areas and present the total process (Fig. 1) as well. With this 
knowledge, we are able to calculate capability changes caused by different 
technological changes. Results from part Q2 provide evaluated forecasting for 1 
and 10 years. Combined with Q3, forecasting for less or more development of 
seven technology areas or combinations of different technology area developments 
can be calculated. 
 
Technology areas used in the questionnaire are: sensor, material, communication, 
stealth, energy source, manufacturing and autonomous technology areas. We asked 
the technical persons consisting of five members of the original group of ten 
respondents, how great are the dependencies between different technology areas. 
The results are summarized in matrixes DUAV and DSAT in Appendix 1 for UAVs 
and satellites correspondingly. 
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Table 1. Three parts of the questionnaire Q1, Q2 and Q3. 
 
 Description Respondents Time 
(T) 
Q1 Changes in capability areas when 
satellites, UAVs or both have been 
deployed. 
5 officers and 5 researchers 1 y,  
10 y 
Q2 Dependence of task capabilities on 
development of technology areas for 
satellites and UAVs. 
5 officers and 5 researchers 10 y,  
20 y 
Q3 Interdependencies between technology 
areas. 
5 researchers (same personnel 
as in Q1 and Q2) 
10 y 
 
In the first part of the questionnaire we have studied the relationship between 
capability areas and systems. In our previous work we have presented a model 
giving functional form between system capability values and capability area 
changes. For a capability area the system capability values can be expressed as 
functions of changes in capability areas values: 
 
),,( 1221 pppfX SATSAT   and 
),,( 1221 pppfX UAVUAV  ,    (1) 
 
where XSAT and XUAV are system capability values with satellites and UAVs in use 
and p1, p2, p12 are changes of capability areas values with satellites, UAVs and 
combined use of satellites and UAVs. Changes are measured between the initial 
values p0 (T=0) of capabilities and the final values (T=1, 10).  
 
We present two possible alternatives for the functional forms in Equation (1). Our 
own model from (Kuikka & Suojanen, 2014) is shortly summarized with the 
following equations: 
 
km0 XXp =  
))1)(X-(1-(1Xp SATm10 kX=p   
))1)(X-(1-(1Xp UAVm20 kXp   
))1)(1)(X-(1-(1Xp SATm120 kUAV XX=p  , (2) 
 
where XSAT, XUAV are the system capability values for satellites and UAVs. And Xm 
and Xk are the system capability values for serial and parallel systems functioning 
with the satellite and UAV systems. Equations (2) follow from the probabilistic 
definition of capabilities. In our basic model the equation are similar for the three 
capability areas under consideration: protection, situational awareness and 
engagement. 
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From Equations (2) we can solve XSAT, XUAV, Xk, and Xm: 
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Serial and parallel systems need not be specified in more detail, however their 
capability values Xm and Xk can be used in the analysis if desired. More details of 
the model (Q1) are presented in (Kuikka & Suojanen, 2014). 
 
Martino (Martino, 1993 and Kim, 2012) introduced a scoring model for rating 
technology quantitatively: 
 
vw
xyzba
kKjJiI
hHgGfFeEdDcCBA
S
)1()(
)1()()(


 , (4) 
 
where c+d+e=1, f+g=1, i+j=1, a+b+z+y+x=1 and w+v=1. In the model A and B 
are overriding factors and {C, D, E}, {F, G}, and {I, J} are exchangeable factors 
within brackets. I, J, and K are costs or undesirable factors. The factors (1 + hH) 
and (1 + kK) represent special cases that must stand alone but cannot be traded off 
with any other factors. Moreover, they may not always be present. Factor H is not 
overriding, in the sense that its absence justifies a score of 0. It is an option that 
increases the score if present but does not affect the score if absent. In the same 
way, just because undesirable factor K has a value of 0 for some devices does not 
mean that their score should be infinite. In Equation (4) h and k are constants. The 
use of this method is an exception to the rule that weights must be normalized to 
sum to 1.0. Since there is only one factor in each group, however, normalization 
does not distort the overall score (Martino, 1993). Martino’s model can be 
compared with our model, the serial system Xm can be considered a combination of 
overriding factors and the parallel systems are exchangeable factors in Martino’s 
formulation. Cost or undesirable factors are not examined explicitly in our model, 
their effects are included in evaluated capability values. In our method, systems of 
systems are modelled with serial and parallel systems and no extra factors like 
(1+hH) exist. Another scoring model with similar ideas has been introduced by 
Gordon and Munson (Martino, 1993 and Kim, 2012). 
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From Figure 1, we see that following the chain “Q3-Q2-T/C-Q1” changes in 
capability areas and systems capabilities can be calculated as a function of 
technology area developments. The overall model is modular in the sense that in 
the modelling process sub models Q1, Q2, Q3 or T/C can be changed. For 
example, in this paper the model for T/C dependency is the simplest choice of just 
identifying operational tasks with capability areas. A refined model could be a 
weighted combination or a function of different task capabilities. Another example 
would be a more detailed system model in Q1 resulting in different functional 
forms of fSAT and fUAV in Equations (1) and (3). In other words, we have constructed 
the method in the spirit of system of systems. The idea of the chosen approach is to 
distinguish the task into two parts: firstly to form an information model for the 
existence of dependencies; and secondly to construct the detailed models for the 
dependency structures. The purpose of this paper is to draw together the individual 
models. 
 
Next we present the relationship between the development of technology areas and 
task capabilities. In our model, task capabilities are calculated as average values of 
technological development values: 
 
5,...,1,
7
1
7,1
,  

jAC
i
jij ,    (5) 
 
where matrix element Ai,j describes the development of technology area i on task 
capability j.   Justification for the average value as a measure is that we regard the 
respondents automatically weighted the importance of each technology area 
affecting task capabilities. Sum of technology development values is normalized, 
and as a consequence, we end up with the average value in Equation (5). 
 
We need matrices from second (matrix A) and third part (matrix D) of the 
questionnaire. Matrix A gives the relationship between technology areas and tasks. 
Matrix D gives the interdependency between technology areas. In Equation (6) 
7,...,1,  kk  describes development in technology area k less or more than 
forecasted in the questionnaire data. The forecasted values are listed later in Table 
5. For example, if 01   no development in sensor technology occurs, and if 
5.12   material technology develops 50 % better than forecasted. To make this 
clear, parameter values of k  are listed in Table 8 in Appendix 1. 
 
   7,...,1,5,...,1,11
7
1
,
7,1
,  

kjDAC kki
i
jij .  (6) 
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In Equation (6) we assumed that only one of the parameter values k , at a time, is 
different from one: .1k  We will relax this assumption later in Equation (8). In 
Equation (6), if 1 k , the development of technology area k is at the same level 
as forecasted in Table 5. Matrix element Di,k describes the effect of technology area 
k on technology area i. For simplicity, we omit index k on the left side of the 
equation. Next, we calculate a special case of task capabilities where one of the 
technology areas has no development. In this case 7...,1,1,...,1,1 ''  kkkk  
and 0' k (for 
'kk  ).  In Equation (6) the term inside the sum is: 
 
  ',, 111 kikki DD     for 5,...,1j  and 
'kk   
  111 ,  kkiD    for 5,...,1j  and
'kk  . (7) 
 
Next, Equation (6) is further generalized in Equation (8). We can calculate 
iteratively task capabilities when more than one technology area develops less or 
more than evaluated in Table 5.  
 
   5,...,1,11
7
1
7,1
,
7,1
,  

jDAC
k
kki
i
jij ,  (8) 
 
where the product is taken over all technology areas. In the previous section, we 
discussed possible extensions of the model in Equation (8). Jumps, triggered at 
specified levels of capabilities or at some other conditions, can easily be 
implemented, for example, in a spreadsheet application. Also, we discussed the 
applications for rare events and expected value evaluations. 
 
In Equations (6) and (8) we assume that technology development is linear having 
no “quantum leaps” when 7,...,1,1,0  kk . These disruptive technological 
changes may cause dramatic impacts on other technology areas and enable or 
disable certain capabilities. Also the linear improvement (e.g. capacity of energy 
storage) does not necessarily correspond linear improvement on the capabilities, 
but there may be thresholds before any improvements appear. Besides, negative 
impacts of achievements of the technology areas on the capabilities are possible, 
for example, improvements in stealth technology or materials may decrease 
capability to perform surveillance as effectively as today. However, we reported in 
our first conference article (Suojanen et al., 2014): “Technology development of 
the RED nation was frozen in the estimation of the capabilities, since the focus was 
on own assets.” Consequently, no negative impacts caused by the adversary’s 
technological counter measures exist in the results. 
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Research Data and Error Analysis 
 
In this section, we present research data from questionnaires Q1 and Q2 in the 
extent that is needed for analysing the results of questionnaire Q3. Presentation of 
new results of this paper is postponed to the next section. At the end of this section 
an error analysis is conducted. The relationship between the score values and the 
percentage values from questionnaires Q1 and Q2 is assumed to be valid also in 
questionnaire Q3. This can be justified because five of the experts participated in 
both questionnaires Q2 and Q3 (see Table 1). Because the data from our earlier 
work is used, we present the error analysis in this section. The same error levels are 
assumed to hold in questionnaire Q3. 
 
Two questionnaires (Q1 and Q2 in Figure 1) have been conducted in our earlier 
research (Kuikka & Suojanen, 2014 and Kuikka et al., 2015). In Table 2 the 
average capability changes for situational awareness from the questionnaire Q1 are 
shown. The average value is justified because no scenarios were explicitly used in 
Questionnaire 2 and at the same time the evaluations were giving on the grounds of 
three basic scenarios from Questionnaire 1. Another justification is provided in 
(Urwin et al., 2010) where scenarios are used only in effectiveness measures, not in 
performance measures. Note that the changes are provided at the level of capability 
areas, not for satellite or UAV systems. The initial values for the awareness 
capabilities are 0.8, 0.6 and 0.4 for Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 respectively. For example, 
in Scenario 1 after ten years development the awareness capability is 0.8 + 0.085 = 
0.885 (88.5 %) when UAVs are in use. In Reference (Kuikka & Suojanen, 2014) 
also results for protection and engagement capability areas are given for 1, 10 and 
20 years’ time span. In this paper we study situational awareness 10 years 
development as an example, other cases can be examined similarly. The initial 
values for protection, awareness and engagement capability areas together with 
average capability changes for 10 years development are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 2. The changes of situational awareness capability produced by satellite and 
UAV systems for Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 in 10 years. The last column shows the 
average values of scenarios. 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
10 years 
Sce1 Sce2 Sce3 average 
 
SAT 0.063 0.083 0.157 0.101 
UAV 0.085 0.123 0.173 0.127 
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Table 3. The initial capability values (T=0) for Scenarios 1 – 3 are shown. The 
average capability value changes with satellites and UAVs are calculated for 10 
years development. The average capability changes have been calculated similarly 
as the average values for situational awareness in Table 2. 
 
Capability 
area 
Scenario 
1 
T=0 
Scenario 2 
T=0 
Scenario 3 
T=0 
Average 
SAT, T=10 
Average 
UAV, T=10 
Protection 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.071 0.087 
Sit. Awareness 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.101 0.127 
Engagement 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.049 0.101 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, both Questionnaire 1 and Questionnaire 2 include 
evaluations for 10 years technological development. In addition, the evaluated 
changes have been given in two different formats, in percentages and in score 
values 0 – 3. The same personnel took part in both questionnaires. These facts give 
us an opportunity to formulate a functional relationship between scores and 
percentages. The functional form of the dependence between the score values and 
the percentage values must be linear, since they describe the same quantity, only 
the scaling is different. Figure 2 shows the correspondence together with the linear 
regression fit 7.58*Score-1.39 between the two data sets. In spite of the fact, that 
Questionnaire 1 and 2 have been conducted one after the other, because of different 
formats and limited time for answering, the questionnaires can be considered 
almost independent of each other. As a result, we get a shortcut for estimating error 
levels of capability changes. The 95 % confidence interval (Levine et al., 2010, 
Chapter 13, Equation 13.20) for the forecasted mean value 8.9 is (8.9-1.5, 
8.9+1.5)=(7.4, 10.4). Another statistic is the coefficient of determination R
2
 = 0.80 
and the corresponding correlation coefficient R = +0.89. These statistics indicate 
that the linear relationship gives a fairly good description of the data. The matrix 
element values AUAV and ASAT in Appendix 1 and the corresponding values in 
Table 5 have been calculated from the linear relationship. 
 
Figure 2 gives us a practical perception about error levels. Because of subjective 
evaluations and the small number of participants of the questionnaires no detailed 
analysis, and no detailed error analysis, is meaningful. After all, our main purpose 
is to demonstrate methods of model building. In Reference (Kuikka et al., 2015) we 
have presented standard deviation values of the questionnaire data. The results are 
consistent with the confidence level and the coefficient of determination statistics. 
The average capability values and the corresponding standard deviations of ten 
respondents are summarized in Table 4. The standard deviations are considerably 
higher compared to the previous confidence level estimation. The explanation is 
that they measure different uncertainties. Standard deviations describe individual 
points and higher standard deviations are a consequence of different levels of 
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estimation among respondents. In the regression analysis, the confidence level 
describes the goodness of the regression line to predict the linear relationship 
between the two data sets. The confidence level approach is more appropriate for 
the situation at hand. 
 
Table 4. The average Score values from Questionnaire 2 and the corresponding 
standard deviations (STD) in parenthesis. 
 
 SAT, T=10 
Score, (STD) 
UAV, T=10 
Score, (STD) 
Deception (Prot) 1.11 (0.87) 1.53 (0.92) 
Surveillance (Awa) 1.27 (0.88) 1.76 (0.74) 
Engagement (Eng) 0.91 (0.83) 1.59 (0.86) 
 
Figure 2 shows that the confidence interval close to the mean point (1.5, 10.0 %) is 
about 2.0 % and 4.0 % for the 90 % and 97.5 % confidence levels respectively. The 
confidence interval is wider for the values not close to the mean point. The 
confidence intervals can be used to observe the significant values in Tables 6 and 7. 
The last two columns in the tables show the 90 % and 97.5 % confidence level 
values (½*interval) and the significant changes on the confidence level 90 % are 
bolded in the Tables 6 and 7. The results indicate that the UAV capability changes 
are statistically significant on the 90 % confidence level except for the engagement 
capability change. The satellite capability changes are significant for the 
surveillance and communication capability changes on the 90 % confidence level 
except for the stealth technology.  For the deception capability change the 
communication and autonomous technologies are statistically significant. These 
results are intuitively very understandable. (For comparison, the last column in 
Tables 6 and 7 show the 97.5 % confidence level thresholds. Interestingly, on the 
97.5 % confidence level the surveillance capability changes for UAVs are not 
statistically significant.) 
 
The uncertainties in matrix elements Di,k should be analysed with the help of 
standard deviations. Because of a small number of respondents (5) the standard 
deviations are very high. The standard deviations are 2
1/2
 times higher compared to 
the values in parentheses in Table 4. We can only make a rough estimate about the 
uncertainties: the errors are 30 % on the basis of one unit standard error (error in 
Tables 6 and 7 values is roughly 0.005). 
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Figure 2. The relationship between Questionaire 1 (%) and Questionaire 2 (Score) 
data. The regression line and the 90 % and 97.5 % confidence levels are shown. 
The full set of parameters of the statistical analysis is presented in Appendix 2. 
Numerical Results of This Study 
 
The theoretical background has been presented earlier in this paper in section 
“Modelling the Interdependencies between Technology Areas”. In this section the 
numerical results and some examples of applying the theory for different 
technology areas are presented. We show also how the results of this study can be 
combined with the results of our earlier studies. 
 
In Table 5, the capability changes for UAVs and satellites for five operational tasks 
are calculated from Equation (5). The values correspond to the linear regression fit 
of Figure 2. 
 
Table 5. The capability changes for UAVs and satellites from Equation (5). 
 
 Surveil-
lance 
Communi-
cations 
Engage-
ment 
Logistics Deception 
UAVs 0.119 0.107 0.106 0.082 0.102 
Satellites 0.082 0.094 0.055 0.051 0.071 
 
In Tables 6 and 7, changes downward in percentages are given for UAVs and 
satellites (Note that because the model for interdependencies is linear, changes 
upwards are considered similarly). We illustrate the use of the tables by an 
example. According Table 6, if UAV sensor technology is not developing at all, 
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while other UAV technologies develop as evaluated in Table 5, surveillance task 
capability of UAV system decreases from 11.9 % (Table 5 UAV Surveillance) to 
9.1 % (11.9 % - 2.8 % = 9.1 %). This stands for 23.2 % relative decrease. The 
situational awareness value is the sum of the initial capability value (Table 3) and 
the change, for example in Scenario 1 the capability value is 85.2 % 
(0.8+0.085*(11.9/12.7)-0.028=0.852). Here, we have taken into account the 
adjusting  between the regression line estimate 11.9 % (in Table 5) and the 
questionnaire result 12.7 % (in Tables 2 and 3), as we have concluded that the 
regression line approach eliminates some sources of error in the evaluations. 
 
We provide one example how the errors can be evaluated. Based on the estimations 
in the previous section, the error estimation is roughly 
0+0.2*0.085+0.3*0.028=0.025. The initial value has no error because the value 0.8 
is defined in the scenario. As a result, the situational capability area value for 
Scenario 1 UAV systems in use is between 83 % - 85 % (82.7 % - 85.2 %) with no 
development in sensor technology. Other cases can be evaluated similarly. 
 
Table 6. The decrease of task capabilities when no development occurs on one of 
the technology areas (UAVs). 
 
Task/Tech-
nology 
sensor material comm stealth energy manuf autom  CL90% CL97.5% 
Surveillance 0.028 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.025  0.019 0.032 
Comm 0.024 0.026 0.027 0.020 0.025 0.024 0.022  0.015 0.024 
Engagement 0.023 0.027 0.022 0.025 0.021 0.027 0.022  0.014 0.024 
Logistics 0.015 0.022 0.018 0.013 0.020 0.023 0.018  0.012 0.020 
Deception 0.023 0.028 0.020 0.023 0.017 0.025 0.026  0.013 0.022 
 
Table 7. The decrease of task capabilities when no development occurs on one of 
the technology areas (satellites). 
 
Task/Tech-
nology 
sensor material comm stealth energy manuf autom  CL90% CL97.5% 
Surveillance 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.007 0.019 0.020 0.016  0.012 0.020  
Comm 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.010 0.022 0.021 0.017  0.012  0.019  
Engagement 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.006 0.014 0.015 0.012  0.021 0.035  
Logistics 0.009 0.015 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.014 0.009  0.023 0.038  
Deception 0.014 0.013 0.019 0.010 0.013 0.014 0.018  0.015 0.025  
 
Analysing the values in Tables 6 and 7 gives an understanding of the level of 
dependency between technology areas and task capabilities when 
interdependencies between different technology areas have been taken into 
account. For example, UAV material and sensor technology has great influence on 
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surveillance. This is an understandable result when we consider how the 
surveillance task is already enhanced by e.g. SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar). 
 
For UAV we observe also how the lack of development in material technology has 
a great effect on all the tasks except logistics. For satellites one observes how the 
logistics task is not sensitive on the development of sensor technology. It is 
interesting to see how the lack of development on stealth technology does not 
affect greatly to any of the UAV tasks and affects weakly to the satellite tasks.  In 
general, the lack of development in any technology area affects more on the 
development of UAV than satellite capabilities. 
 
If we examine the rows of Tables 6 and 7, we observe two main results. One is that 
UAV surveillance task is dependent on the development of the majority of the 
considered technology areas. The other is that the logistics task of UAV is weakly 
dependent on the majority of the technology areas development and almost 
independent for satellites. 
 
In the following, we examine surveillance task. Similar results can be obtained for 
communication, engagement, logistics and deception operational tasks. Figures 3 
and 4 show examples of calculations where multiple technology areas have 
different development behavior than evaluated in Table 5. In Figure 3, less than 
evaluated technological development, while in Figure 4 more than evaluated 
technological development, is occurring. Figure 3 is for UAV technologies and 
Figure 4 shows both UAV and satellite technologies for comparison. Curves are 
cumulative from left to right: curves at point “energy” have less development in 
energy technology and evaluated development  (Table 5 values) in other 
technology areas, curves at point “sensor” have less development in “energy” and 
“sensor” and evaluated development in “comm”, “auto”, “stealth” and so on. 
 
The choices 50 % and 10 % are representative examples for great and small 
deviations from the evaluated development. Any combinations of 7,...,1,  kk  and 
their values can be calculated from Equation (8). The order of cumulative 
calculation is a choice representing a reliability of a system’s functioning which is 
another concept than dependency of technological developments. Energy, sensor 
and communication technologies are the most critical in this respect while material 
and manufacturing technologies have more profound influence on capabilities 
because of their enabling role with other technologies. Again, any order, 
combination or different values can be calculated from Equation (8). In calculating 
the simultaneous effects of multiple technologies the order of technologies does not 
change the results in the linear model of Equation (8). Service and technical 
characteristics is another classification of technologies (Windrum et al., 2009) and 
from the user point of view services appear more important than purely technical 
characteristics. 
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Figure 3. An example showing decreasing surveillance capability when more than 
one technology area has no development (100 % decrease), 50 % less or 10 % less 
development than evaluated in the questionnaire. Curves are for UAVs. As a 
comparison, the dotted curve for 100 % decrease has no interdependency between 
technology areas.  
 
In Figure 3, the dotted curve shows the case where no interdependencies exist 
between technology areas. The effect of interdependencies can be more than 10 % 
when 100 % less (no development) development in more than one technology areas 
occurs. At point “autonomous technology” none of the technology areas have 
additional or less development compared to Table 5, so interdependency has no 
effect. If all technology areas have technology development as evaluated in Table 
5, interdependency is already implicitly included in the data. 
 
The application of Equation (8) and Figures 3 and 4 is when unexpected technical 
inventions and developments change existing information about developments in 
technology areas. On the other hand Equation (8) can be used as a method for 
sensitivity analysis of one or several technology areas. The curves 100 % in Figure 
4 are only for a sensitivity analysis, because the linear equations are not valid for 
very large values. From the changed technology developments the effects on 
capabilities can be calculated as presented in (Kuikka & Suojanen, 2014, Suojanen 
et al., 2015 and Kuikka et al., 2015). 
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Figure 4. Same as Figure 3 but more development than evaluated in the 
questionnaire has been assumed. Curves are cumulative as in Figure 3. Solid curves 
are for UAVs and dotted curve are for satellites. 
 
In Figure 5, we demonstrate the use of Equation (8) in a more complicated 
situation. In practice, this means we can allow any values for k we want and 
brings us closer to determining the total uncertainty (notice analogy to 
measurement uncertainty analysis).  Developments in technology areas deviate 
from the initial values in Table 5 according 7,...,1,  kk . For example, the first 
curve has 1.1,5.1,8.0 7,6,5,4,321  . Again, the curve shows cumulative 
effect of 7,...,1,  kk  from left to right. Solid curves are for UAVs and dotted 
curves are for satellites. In Figure 5, significant differences in UAV and satellite 
surveillance capabilities can be observed. For example, satellites are more sensitive 
to sensor technologies and UAVs are more sensitive to stealth technologies. 
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Figure 5. Examples of using the model with different technology area 
developments. In figure values of 7,...,1,  jj in Equation (8) are shown. Curves 
are cumulative in j . Solid curves are for UAVs and dotted curves for satellites. 
Values of 7,...,1,  jj  are shown for each curve. 
Conclusions 
 
In this article, we have presented a process flowchart demonstrating how the 
developments in technology areas end up to capability area development (and 
beyond). We formulated mathematical methods in analyzing the intermediate steps 
of the process. While all the numerical results are computed by the methods in this 
/ these article(s) it is important to notice that one is able to use alternative methods 
also; one of our main results in this work is to demonstrate the process itself. 
 
On the system level our model makes use of system of systems principles. 
Satellites and UAVs have been assembled in parallel or in series with other 
systems. This idea can be compared with the ideas in Martino’s more heuristic 
model. Other models, such as the analytical hierarchy process (AHP), require all 
the weights to be recalculated after a new system or task is added into the 
calculation. In our method, if no significant secondary effects exit, a new system 
can be added in serial or in parallel to an existing set of systems with a limited 
amount of recalculations (Kuikka & Suojanen, 2014). 
 
We presented also a tool for estimating the interdependencies between technology 
areas. The numerical results are obtained from a questionnaire asked from 5 
researchers. Results of the questionnaire have been presented for the first time in 
this paper. We show how the proposed method may be applied in conducting 
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sensitivity analysis of the technology development. Our vision is to raise the 
sensitivity analysis of the technology development to the level that it has e.g. in the 
measurement technology. In this paper, we provide several examples of the use of 
the model for technological interdependencies and sensitivity analysis. 
 
One is able to use the proposed method in analyzing the effects of unexpected 
technical inventions and developments. The analysis can be conducted by knowing 
the interdependencies of technology areas and to adjust the knowledge with the 
updated situation (e.g. more effective sensors etc.). Only rough conclusions can be 
made from results of the three questionnaires because of a small number of 
participants and uncertainties in human judgment. Nevertheless, the results can be 
used when the limitations are taken into account. The approach can be used in 
illustrating general impacts of various technological areas and their 
interdependencies. This can be used, for example, in balancing resource allocation 
between technological areas. The results show that material technology has the 
most widespread influence on other six technology areas examined. UAV material 
and sensor technology has a great influence on surveillance. This is an 
understandable result when we consider how the surveillance task is improved by 
radars and other sensors. Logistics task is not sensitive on the development of 
sensor technology in satellites. It is interesting to see how the lack of development 
on stealth technology does not affect greatly to any of the UAV tasks and affects 
weakly to the satellite tasks.  In general, the lack of development in any technology 
area affects more on the development of UAV than satellite capabilities. As said, 
questionnaire data has been examined with the model and methods of this paper. 
More realistic results may be obtained with system modelling or simulation results 
as input data instead of questionnaires. 
 
We demonstrated how to extrapolate impacts of technology changes on capabilities 
with a linear model. This does not take into account possible disruptive or 
threshold effects. If a threshold and its impacts on the technological areas are 
known a non-linear variant of the model is a straightforward extension of our work. 
On the other hand, disruptive changes are unpredictable and their timing and 
effects are difficult or impossible to model. 
 
In our literature review we have made some observations about similarities and 
differences of  methods and models when comparing with our approach. Modelling 
capabilities is usually based on scoring or other measures with no quantitative 
interpretation. Our model has an exact interpretation: capability is defined as the 
probability of success. In the modelling we have concluded that a minimal 
taxonomy includes capability areas, systems of systems and technology areas. 
These all have their internal models and interdependencies. Especially, modelling 
technological interdependencies appears to be a complex task. A basic linear 
deterministic model has been presented in this paper. The model can be compared 
with the stochastic correlation matrix of statistics. The correlation matrix is 
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symmetric while the model proposed in this paper allows different values for 
dependencies depending on the direction of the association. 
 
In our modelling scenarios are used in modelling capability areas while scenarios 
are not used in modelling technological areas. This simplifies the questionnaires 
and the modelling efforts. A comparable approach has been presented in (Urwin et 
al., 2010) where the measures of performance are independent of an operational 
scenario and allow the results to be compared with systems that provide the same 
functionality. 
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Appendix 1 
 
We have used the same relationship between scores and probability values 
(capabilities) as in our previous paper: 
 
Capability = 0.0758*Score-0.0139.   (9) 
 
Scores 0, 1, 2 and 3 have been used in evaluation because probability values are 
more difficult to estimate. Equation (9) has been derived from the first and second 
parts of the questionnaire with the help of the fact that the same answers have been 
given as probabilities and as scores in these two parts of the questionnaire. In Table 
1, these are the cases for satellites and UAVs for 10 years development with three 
capability areas identified with corresponding three tasks: protection with 
deception task, situational awareness with surveillance and engagement with 
engagement task. This is justified by the fact that in the second part of the 
questionnaire general tasks were evaluated with no direct connection with scenarios 
of the questionnaire. In other words, results concerning task capabilities are 
averages over three scenarios of the questionnaire. 
 
Matrixes used in calculations for UAVs and satellites. Matrix A gives the 
relationship between technology areas and tasks. Matrix D gives the 
interdependency between technology areas. Equation (9) is used in transformation 
from scores to probabilities (capabilities). Note that the columns and rows are 
arranged in the same order than in Tables 6 and 7. 
 























0.1380.0920.1070.1070.123
0.0920.1000.1000.0770.092
0.0620.1000.0920.1230.130
0.1070.0390.1230.0770.107
0.0870.0850.1070.1450.130
0.1230.1000.1070.1070.115
0.1070.0620.1070.1150.138
UAVA  
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






















0.1070.0470.0620.0920.085
0.0540.0690.0620.0850.085
0.0470.0470.0620.1000.085
0.0540.0320.0240.0470.032
0.1070.0470.0620.1300.107
0.0540.0770.0470.0960.062
0.0690.0390.0690.1070.123
SATA  
 























1.0000.1230.1230.1230.1530.0470.168
0.0921.0000.0920.0620.0620.1380.062
0.0470.1231.0000.0920.0470.1230.032
0.0620.1530.0471.0000.0770.1980.077
0.1230.1230.1070.0621.0000.0770.092
0.0160.1230.0620.1230.1071.0000.047
0.1070.1530.0920.0770.0160.1681.000
UAVD  
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Representative values of parameter 7,...,1,  kk  used in calculations. 
 
0 k  No development in technology area k. 
1 k  Same development in technology area k than in Table 5. 
1.1k  10 % more development in technology area k than in Table 5. 
5.1k  50 % more development in technology area k than Table 5. 
2 k  100 % more development in technology area k than Table 5. 
9.0k  10 % less development in technology area k than in Table 5. 
5.0k  50 % less development in technology area k than in Table 5. 























1.0000.0770.0920.0320.0920.0320.107
0.0921.0000.1230.0320.0620.1230.077
0.0470.1231.0000.0000.0160.1070.032
0.0160.0770.0321.0000.0470.0470.032
0.0160.0920.1070.0621.0000.0620.092
0.0770.1230.0620.0920.0161.0000.047
0.0620.1530.1070.0320.0920.1981.000
SATD
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Appendix 2 
Table 9. Statistical analysis of Figure 2 with full set of parameters is outlined in the 
table. On the left, the 10 year input data from questionnaires Q1 (%) and Q2 
(Score) are shown. The confidence interval (lower, upper) is calculated at point x0 
= 1.5 to show the idea of calculating the 90 % confidence level curves in Figure 2. 
The Excel worksheet used in the calculations is available from (Zaiontz, 2015). 
 
 
